[…] First, Russian political and military leadership remains concerned about NATO’s relative advantage in the air domain—a dynamic that will likely intensify over the next five years as large numbers of fifth-generation fighters enter NATO inventories. Russia enjoys a relative advantage in rapidly deployable ground forces in regions close to Russian borders, notably the Baltic states and Poland.

However, Russian strategy documents, statements, and actions indicate particular concern about the depth and speed provided by NATO’s advanced platforms and munitions, which could serve to blunt Russia’s ground advantage. Furthermore, observations of Western targeting practices over the past two decades have raised Russian concerns about the vulnerability of Russian ground forces, military bases, and critical infrastructure, as well as political leadership, to NATO’s combat air capabilities. Although the perceived extent of NATO’s relative airpower advantage is unclear, Russian defense analysts evaluating the combat potential of Western military aircraft have historically considered qualities such as firepower, mobility, survivability, and command and control, as well as a platform type’s contributions to units and larger formations.

These are all areas where the increase in capability resulting from NATO’s modernization efforts will become more pronounced in the next five years. Extensive Russian investment in integrated air defense systems (IADS) underscores the significance with which Russia views the air domain a central dimension of its military planning. Läs rapporten

Between 2011 and today, many Western leaders who supported the military intervention in Libya nine years earlier have expressed some kind of regret about the war. But not a single Libyan politician went on the record to criticise NATO’s killing of civilians and the destruction of Libya.

Former US President Barack Obama, whose administration participated and actively supported “humanitarian intervention”, regretted his decision. In an interview with The Atlantic magazine published in 2014, he described the intervention as “the worst mistake” of his administration. Behind closed doors, he told The Atlantic reporter that it was a “shit show”. The warmonger within his administration, Hillary Clinton, never regretted the disaster, despite the death of a US ambassador to Libya in 2012. Clinton, along with two other administration staff, drove Obama into the mess in Libya without any idea as to what to do once the government of Muammar Gaddafi was gone. […]

I once asked Hashim Bisher, a former top militia commander in Tripoli, why he does not distance his group from the rest by recognising the civilian victims of NATO? He explained that this would mean that we are “against” what NATO did, meaning, “we are not grateful to NATO or the revolution.” This kind of bizarre thinking made the majority of Libyans hate the militias who are supposed to have “liberated” them from Gaddafi’s rule, only to rule them with an iron fist ever since Gaddafi was toppled and murdered nine years ago. Läs artikel

On October 14, the African Union’s Peace and Security Commissioner Smail Chergui, an Algerian diplomat, published an op-ed in Le Temps. He argued that strategies for the Sahel – he and others put the current count at more than 17 – need to be revisited and harmonized. As part of that argument, Chergui includes a section on “dialogue with extremists.” Chergui does not mention any specific groups, but he writes that “any innovative idea is welcome” when it comes to making peace, and that the February 2020 accord with the Taliban “can inspire our member states to explore dialogue with extremists and encourage them to lay down arms, particularly those who were recruited by force. […]

On October 19, Le Monde published an interview with United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres in which he, too, expresses openness to the idea of dialogue with certain jihadists. He ruled out dialogue with the Islamic State’s affiliates, which would seem to leave JNIM. Guterres’ suggestion that certain jihadists “have an interest in engaging in this dialogue in order to become political actors in the future” is a really interesting one: this, of course, brings us back to the perennial question of what JNIM, and especially ag Ghali, might actually want in a political sense. Guterres’ comments were covered in the international Anglophone media as well as in Malian and Mauritanian outlets. People in the Sahel are definitely paying attention to what these major regional and international actors are saying on this topic.

My general take, as regular readers likely know, is that talking with jihadists is well worth doing, especially if negotiations can produce what I call “stabilizing settlements.” Läs artikel

Visepresidenten i Norges Forsvarforening, Lars Echroll, har skrevet innlegg i Nordlys 13. og 20. oktober. Vi kan være enige i at Norge har redusert forsvaret i våre egne nordområder altfor mye de siste 20 årene. Hovedgrunnen til det har vært en satsing på militære innsats i kriger i andre land, som Afghanistan, Irak, Libya, Jordan. Begrunnelsen har vært å hjelpe til i kriger der USA er engasjert for å bygge opp en politisk kapital i USA, slik at USA vil støtte Norge i krise og krig. Jeg tror dette har vært en feilslått tankegang, det er ikke sånn stormakter fungerer.

De mest aktive pådriverne for denne utviklingen har vært Høyres og Arbeiderpartiets forsvars- og utenriksministere i denne perioden, men jeg har ikke registrert mye motstand fra Norges Forsvarsforening heller. Nå øker den sikkerhetspolitiske spenningen i nord, og Norge ruster forsiktig opp igjen. Det er fornuftig, og et sterkere norsk forsvar i nord må vi ha mot vårt naboland stormakten Russland.

Det vil derimot øke spenningen dersom Norge tilrettelegger for alliert hjelp i mye sterkere grad enn for 30-40 år siden, slik Lars Echroll skriver og går inn for. I stedet burde Norge gjeninnføre de selvpålagte restriksjonene fra den kalde krigens dager med basepolitikken og restriksjoner på alliert militær aktivitet i Finnmark. Läs artikel

This article draws on identity construction, emotions and a notion of productive power to address the question of why Swedish policymakers and public opinion are becoming increasingly supportive of NATO membership. It contributes theoretically by arguing that such textual phenomena intertwine with ‘disciplinary power’, which operates on the bodies of the subjects of power, exposing them to verbal and physical sanctions, a host of complex feelings and enhanced levels of self-disciplining.

The article analyses 354 editorials and op-eds related to Sweden and NATO, published in the four biggest Swedish newspapers in 2014–2018; 1408 tweets, with a focus on 14 selected NATO campaigners and their advocacy; and semi-structured interviews with 12 such influencers. It concludes that Swedish NATO campaigners produce and negotiate emotional discourses in a way that targets other influencers and potential influencers by exposing them to ridicule and allegations of treason. While tendencies are similar on both sides of the debate, the article demonstrates that productive power currently intertwines with disciplinary power in a way that makes anti-NATO advocacy seem more fraught with personal risk than pro-NATO campaigning, and joining NATO appear to be the most normal, realistic and responsible policy option. Läs artikel

Japan opposes any actions that escalate tension in the East and South China Seas, Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga said on Wednesday as he wrapped up a trip to Vietnam and Indonesia, but he added Tokyo was not aiming at an ”Asian NATO” to contain any specific country. […]

”Japan is opposed to any actions that escalate tensions in the South China Sea. Let me stress anew the importance of all the countries concerning the South China Sea issues not resorting to force or coercion, but working toward peaceful resolutions of the disputes based on international law,” Suga told a news conference in Jakarta.

”Our response in the South China Sea is not aimed at any one country,” Suga said, when asked if Japan wanted to create an Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Suga’s Southeast Asia trip follows a meeting in Tokyo this month of the “Quad”, an informal grouping of India, Australia, Japan and the United States that Washington sees as a bulwark against China’s growing regional influence.

China has denounced the grouping of the four democracies as a ”mini-NATO” aimed at containing its development. Läs artikel

Våpen, trening og militærbaser: Regjeringen legger stadig mer vekt på alliansen med USA.

[…] Utviklingen er i dag alarmerende på flere fronter, også i vår egen del av verden. Stormaktsrivaliseringen skjer nærmest i vår egen skjærgård. Vi blir stadig utsatt for cyberangrep og desinformasjon. Vi kan ikke ignorere at demokratiske verdier utfordres, at det europeiske byggverket skaker, at det amerikanske samfunnet forvitrer, at fundamentalisme og hat finner gjenklang i kommentarfeltenes ekkokammer. Vi må våkne opp – og stå imot.

Beredskap koster. Et dugelig militært forsvar er dyrt. Selvsagt skulle vi vært kostnaden foruten, men det koster å forsikre seg.

Regjeringa la i vår fram sitt forslag til en ny langtidsplan for forsvarssektoren. Den ble – høyst uvanlig – sendt tilbake. Stortingsflertallet mente den ikke var god nok. Det er et syn jeg deler. Uenigheten går på ambisjonsnivå, både hva gjelder tid og penger. Derimot er det bred enighet om den sikkerhetspolitiske analysen. Regjeringa trekker opp et godt bilde av virkeligheten, men vegrer seg for å trekke de åpenbare konklusjonene om hva som faktisk trengs for å møte den. Den velger å overse virkeligheten. Kunnskapen er der, forståelsen vokser fram. Men det skorter på viljen: viljen til å stå opp, og dermed: evnen til å stå imot. […]

Trygghet og sikkerhet krever sterkere beredskap, med et styrket militært forsvar. Det koster mer enn politikere – og vi, som velgere – hittil har vist vilje til å bekoste.

Krig er i stor grad en kamp om vilje. Vår egen motstandskamp under andre verdenskrig var også mer enn noe en viljekamp. Norsk forsvarsdebatt er blitt en budsjettdebatt, med treg mobilisering av vilje under dekke av krevende budsjettdekning.

Vi må gjøre forsvarsdebatten til en viljekamp.

Forsvar er og blir et spørsmål om nasjonal vilje.

Med den kan vi skape nødvendig militær evne.

Dét krever et storting som tar politisk ansvar. Läs artikel