250 söks – så byggs Nato upp i Sverige, expressen.se

Försvarsmakten riskerar växtvärk.

Minst 250 av Sveriges mest erfarna officerare kommer att ta plats i olika Nato-staber.

Den bedömningen gör Officersförbundets ordförande Lars Fresker. Men samtidigt växer försvaret och nya officerare måste in för att klara utbyggnaden och klara alla pensionsavgångar. Läs artikel

The Case Against Finland Joining NATO, nationalinterest.org

Benjamin H. Friedman, policy director at Defense Priorities. Justin Logan is a senior fellow at the Cato Institut

[…] The case for Finland is especially problematic. Washington should withhold its support, at least until existing European allies make a convincing case that they will bear any added burden. The United States can have good and mutually beneficial relations with Finland without threatening nuclear annihilation of Russians—the core promise on which NATO runs—on its behalf. Nor does it leave Finland very insecure: Finland’s long-time neutrality has been a great security success, and it is still safe.

These considerations should at least be heatedly debated in the thirty NATO states whose unanimity is required to admit new members. Citizens of these countries, mostly vibrant democracies, have a say in who they agree to potentially fight to defend. Instead of honoring that democratic reality, or even cynically genuflecting to it, U.S. and NATO leaders simply assert that the alliance will support the new applicants’ membership. NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg declared ex cathedra that Finland’s accession will be “smooth and swift.”

It perhaps shouldn’t be surprising that Stoltenberg, a Norwegian, is so aggressively pushing for NATO to expand to Finland and perhaps Sweden. One enduring reality of NATO is that frontline states have always energetically supported pushing NATO’s border further away to a new frontline state. But the secretary-general doesn’t get a vote. The fact that he thinks the decision is up to him is a sign of NATO’s isolation from the publics whose labor allows it to exist. Läs artikel

Finland, Sweden May Join NATO But At What Price? theaseanpost.com

[…] Among Finnish liberals, there is talk of improving and reforming the alliance from within, making it less hawkish, with the help of Sweden. In general, there is the sense that a country whose leaders have long had their finger on the pulse of the Kremlin has lost the count.

“There used to be the sense: we know these people; they know us,” the Finnish thinker and legal theorist Martti Koskenniemi told me.

“But you can’t negotiate with a power that no longer knows where its interests lie. And if the power is more powerful than you are – and becomes in a sense crazy – then membership in NATO becomes reasonable.”

Whether Finland and Sweden will actually be safer in NATO is another question. Their declarations have only drawn a mild rebuke from the Kremlin, which has warned against a military build-up in both countries. Vladimir Putin’s regime has never suggested the possibility of hostilities against either country, with which it has consistently enjoyed cordial relations. […]

Few Finnish elites seem to think they will be manifestly safer in NATO, and no one is fooled about the sacredness of NATO’s article 5. “NATO’s defence of its members is an open-ended negotiation process,” Koskenniemi freely admits. He sees Finland’s entry into NATO operating at the level of appearances. “It’s not that we were very insecure yesterday, and will be very secure in NATO tomorrow,” he says. “It’s that this is a negotiation with a country that can no longer negotiate, and so NATO membership helps clarify our position to them.”

But Koskenniemi is fully aware that with NATO membership, another striking feature Finland once exhibited to the world will recede. The very possibility of a state going its own way in Europe now seems slightly more distant. Läs artikel

Finland does not consider the state treaties it has concluded to be an obstacle to NATO membership, pledgetimes.com

The Foreign Ministry’s legal chief considers it possible that Russia will protest Finland’s application for NATO membership, citing international agreements.

State Department has submitted in advance to the Defense Alliance NATO international agreements binding on Finland, which may be relevant when considering Finland’s membership. The agreements concern, among other things, Åland’s demilitarized status and Finland’s relations with neighboring Russia.

Finland however, binding obligations are not considered an obstacle to the submission of an application for NATO membership by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is the assessment of the Chief Justice Kaija Suvanto from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the same is stated in a report published by the Government on Sunday.

“None of our existing obligations require termination or modification [Natoon] due to accession, ”Suvanto tells STT.

However, he considers it possible that Russia will also object to Finland’s membership in NATO along diplomatic routes. Representatives of the Russian administration have repeatedly stated that Russia does not sympathize with Finland’s and Sweden’s possible NATO membership.

“It is possible that Russia will express its position by note or orally and consider that there is some violation of the agreement,” Suvanto said. He said it would ultimately be up to politicians to respond to such an objection.

Finland has committed itself to a number of international agreements. In terms of relations with Russia, the NATO process has assessed three security-relevant entities: the 1992 state agreement between Finland and Russia, the 1947 Paris peace agreement and the agreements on the demilitarization of Åland. Läs artikel

Taking it up an escalatory notch: US mulls sending anti-ship missiles to Zelensky, responsiblestatecraft.org

Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Editorial Director of Responsible Statecraft and Senior Advisor at the Quincy Institute

It would be really difficult to believe that the United States is not in a proxy war with Russia if reports that it plans to send anti-ship missiles to Ukraine are true.

In fact, the State Department did not exactly deny this exclusive report from Reuters that Washington was readying to share the weapons capability to help “defeat Russia’s naval blockade…amid concerns more powerful weapons that could sink Russian warships would intensify the conflict.”

“As the conflict is changing, so too is our military assistance to deliver the critical capabilities Ukraine needs for today’s fight as Russia’s forces engage in a renewed offensive in eastern Ukraine,” a State spokesperson said on Friday.

The only thing that is being directly denied are assertions by the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs adviser, who tweeted Friday that “the US is preparing a plan to destroy the [Russian] Black Sea Fleet. The effective work of the Ukrainians on [Russian] warships convinced [the US] to prepare a plan to unblock the [Ukrainian] ports. Deliveries of powerful anti-ship weapons are being discussed.”

Pentagon spokesman John Kirby, asked about this at the briefing Friday, was adamant: “I can tell you definitively that that’s not true.” This unfortunately has the splitting hairs quality of the denial/non denial a couple of weeks ago when the Pentagon confirmed reports it was supplying targeting intelligence to the Ukrainian military but not specifically to sink Russian ships or kill its generals.

When asked whether the U.S. would be sending those anti-ship missiles, Kirby was more ambiguous:

We are — we are talking to the Ukrainians every day, as you know in fact, today’s another one of those days when the Secretary is going to talk to Minister Reznikoff about — we talked to them about their needs and our capabilities. And when we have decisions, we come right out here and we issue a press release and we tell you about that. So, I’m not going to get ahead of decisions that haven’t been made. We’re doing the best we can to meet their — their capabilities in as near real-time as we can. […]

Pushing forward with these more advanced weapons increases the odds of a wider war dragging NATO into the fray, and worse, nuclear conflict. If the U.S. has not yet decided to take this up a notch with anti-ship missiles, officials may want to consult more temperate voices before it reaches the point of no return. Läs artikel

Exclusive: U.S. aims to arm Ukraine with advanced anti-ship missiles to fight Russian blockade, reuters.com

The White House is working to put advanced anti-ship missiles in the hands of Ukrainian fighters to help defeat Russia’s naval blockade, officials said, amid concerns more powerful weapons that could sink Russian warships would intensify the conflict.

Ukraine has made no secret it wants more advanced U.S. capabilities beyond its current inventory of artillery, Javelin and Stinger missiles, and other arms. Kyiv’s list, for example, includes missiles that could push the Russian navy away from its Black Sea ports, allowing the restart of shipments of grain and other agricultural products worldwide. Läs artikel

Russia halts gas supply to Finland amid payments, NATO rows, politico.eu

Russia’s Gazprom on Saturday shut off gas exports to Finland, marking an escalation in tensions between the two countries following Helsinki’s bid to join the NATO defense alliance.

Nordic gas provider Gasum confirmed that Russia had halted supplies to neighboring Finland and that the company would ”supply natural gas to its customers from other sources” over the coming months, including through the Balticconnector, a pipeline running between Finland and Estonia.

The move to cut off Finland from Russia’s gas resources is also seen as a response to Helsinki’s refusal to pay for Russian gas in rubles, as had been demanded by the Kremlin. Läs artikel

Utlandsinsatser stärker inte det svenska nationella försvaret

Lars-Gunnar Liljestrand

En arbetsgrupp inom riksdagens försvarsutskott har utvärderat hur Sveriges militära insatser utomlands påverkat det egna försvaret. Man landar i att de positiva erfarenheterna överväger de negativa.

Till en väsentlig del baseras omdömet på att man lagt stor vikt vid hur de enskilda officerarna och soldaterna upplevt insatserna och hur deras egen militära kompetens påverkats.

Avgörande måste dock vara hur insatserna totalt påverkat vårt eget nationella försvar.

Rapporten visar hur försvarets uppbyggnad försenats och hur bristen på personal och materiel samt bristen på övning i större förband inverkat negativt på det nationella försvaret.

”När Försvarsmakten krympte uppstod undanträngningseffekter för det nationella militära försvaret. Materielen slets extra hårt när den användes i insatserna, vilket ledde till en högre materielomsättning och ett ökat behov av underhåll. Försvarsmaktens dåvarande begränsade personalstyrka, i synnerhet inom vissa funktioner (bl.a. singulärkompetenser), fick en hög arbetsbelastning eftersom de fick åka på täta och återkommande rotationer och även fick fler uppgifter och mer ansvar när de var hemma i Sverige.”

Läs mer

The Case for Nordic and NATO Realism, project-syndicate.org

Robert Skidelsky, member of the British House of Lords and Professor Emeritus of Political Economy at Warwick University

To be a realist in international relations is to accept that some states are more sovereign than others. “Strict realism” now requires that Sweden and Finland pause before rushing into NATO’s arms, and that the Alliance take a step back before accepting them. […]

After 1945, Stalin could have absorbed Finland into the Soviet Union, or ruled it through a puppet. Finland had been crushed in a war in which it fought on the side of the Germans – something Finns don’t like to be reminded of, though their alliance with Hitler came about only following Stalin’s 1939 invasion.

Still, Stalin was never interested in restoring Czarist rule over Finland. His concern was strategic. As Stalin said in 1940 following the Soviet Union’s “Winter War” with Finland, “we can’t move Leningrad, [so] we must move the borders.” What he demanded, and eventually got, was some 10% of Finnish territory, including a big slice of Karelia near Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), plus some strategic islands. After this land grab, Stalin guaranteed Finnish independence in the 1948 Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, on condition that Finland promised to “fight to repel” any attack on the Soviet Union “through Finnish territory,” with help from the Kremlin if Finland agreed. Unlike the Soviet Union’s Eastern European satellite states, Finland was not required to join the Warsaw Pact when it was established in 1955. Läs artikel

If Russia blocks Baltic states, we will block St Petersburg – interview with Estonian general,

How would Finland joining NATO change Estonia’s outlook as well as the defence outlook of the three Baltic states?

That makes up for us much easier to defend our country especially from the sea and in the air. Even more when Sweden follows Finland, all the situational awareness [around the Baltic Sea] will come much easier, [bringing] possibilities to influence the Russian Baltic fleet. Basically, the Baltic Sea almost become the inner waters of NATO. […]

Are the Baltic states not living up to their deterrence task?

So far, it has worked, but it seems that the Russian government and Putin are taking bigger and faster steps toward the West. […] The objective is instability. Russia cannot occupy the Baltic states, they cannot occupy Eastern Europe, they do not have power for that and I think that they do not want that.

They may do it temporarily, seize some territory, but what they [want to] achieve is the destruction of our culture – way of living – our culture of economy, culture of politics, our values. […]

Suwalki is always seen as [a way] to block us, but they [Russia] may need Suwalki not to block, but to make a connection [with Kaliningrad]. To block, you can just destroy the roads and railways. Then you just monitor when we repair it, you destroy it again. It’s quite easy.

What we will do, and I promise you, in three years, we will do the same with the connection between St Petersburg and Kaliningrad in the [Baltic] Sea. Then they need [the Suwalki] connection, not block, and that’s more difficult. Please, you [Russia] block my Suwalki, I block your Finnish Gulf. But I need the time, just give me two years; we already have sea mines.

The Suwalki gap – gate, line, whatever – that is not only our problem. Next year, we will get the capabilities to cause a strategic dilemma for Russia. We may close the Baltic Sea communication line [between Russia’s exclave of Kaliningrad and St Petersburg], and then the Suwalki gap is not a gap, […] but they need it even more [themselves]. Läs artikel

Joining the West, newleftreview.org

Lily Lynch, co-founder and editor-in-chief of Balkanist Magazine.

[…] ‘Having been firmly opposed to any NATO move only weeks ago’, wrote former Swedish Prime Minister turned liberal thinktank groupie Carl Bildt, the political class ‘will now face a contest between an older generation and younger ones looking at the world with fresh eyes.’ […]

It’s not hard to see why business are so invested. Swedish defense industry giant Saab is expecting major profits from NATO membership. The company, whose majority shareholder is the Wallenberg family, has seen its share price nearly double since the Russian invasion. Chief Executive Micael Johansson has said that Sweden’s NATO membership will open new possibilities for Saab in the areas of missile defense and surveillance. The company is expecting dramatic gains as European countries raise their defense spending, and first quarter reports reveal that operating profits have already risen 10% over last year, to $32 million. […]

But the decision to join NATO does not just rely on a hollowed-out discourse of solidarity; it is also presented as a vital act of self-interest – a defensive response to the ‘Russian threat’. In Sweden’s case, we are asked to believe that the country is currently facing greater security risks than during both World Wars, and that the only way to address them is to enter a beefed-up military alliance. Although Russia is supposedly struggling to make headway against a much weaker opponent in Ukraine – unable to hold the capital, hemorrhaging troops and supplies – we are told that it poses an imminent threat to Stockholm and Helsinki. Läs artikel

”Vi får en bättre lägesbild” – marinens kommendör ser klara fördelar med Finlands Natomedlemskap, svenska.yle.fi

Finlands och Sveriges kommande Natomedlemskap ger ännu bättre förutsättningar att trygga och bevaka Östersjön. Marinen har under den gångna veckan genomfört en exceptionellt mångsidig sjökrigsövning tillsammans med Sverige och USA. […]

Kustbrigaden, kustflottan och Nylands brigad har under den gångna veckan ordnat en exceptionellt mångsidig sjökrigs- och kuststridsövning, från östra Finska viken till Skärgårdshavet och norra Östersjön. […]

Samtidigt som Finland och Sverige har tagit de avgörande stegen mot ett Natomedlemskap, har det transatlantiska försvarssamarbetet tagit allt mer avancerade former ute till havs.

Finländska och svenska örlogsfartyg övar regelbundet tillsammans, men den här gången har också tre större amerikanska fartyg deltagit: en robotjagare i Arleigh Burke-klassen och två stödfartyg, USS Gunston Hall och USS Kearsarge. […]

Den finländska flottstyrkan har också övat att skydda den för Finland livsviktiga kommersiella fartygstrafiken. Finlands och Sveriges kommande Natomedlemskap ger ännu bättre förutsättningar att planera och genomföra sådana operationer till havs.

Hela Östersjön med dess strategiskt viktiga områden, från de danska sunden, Gotland och Åland upp till Finska viken, kommer att omfattas av Natos gemensamma försvarsplanering i framtiden.

– Hela försvaret vinner på att vi får en bättre lägesbild, då vi kan utbyta information med andra Natoländer, säger kommendör Harju. Läs artikel