How would Finland joining NATO change Estonia’s outlook as well as the defence outlook of the three Baltic states?
That makes up for us much easier to defend our country especially from the sea and in the air. Even more when Sweden follows Finland, all the situational awareness [around the Baltic Sea] will come much easier, [bringing] possibilities to influence the Russian Baltic fleet. Basically, the Baltic Sea almost become the inner waters of NATO. […]
Are the Baltic states not living up to their deterrence task?
So far, it has worked, but it seems that the Russian government and Putin are taking bigger and faster steps toward the West. […] The objective is instability. Russia cannot occupy the Baltic states, they cannot occupy Eastern Europe, they do not have power for that and I think that they do not want that.
They may do it temporarily, seize some territory, but what they [want to] achieve is the destruction of our culture – way of living – our culture of economy, culture of politics, our values. […]
Suwalki is always seen as [a way] to block us, but they [Russia] may need Suwalki not to block, but to make a connection [with Kaliningrad]. To block, you can just destroy the roads and railways. Then you just monitor when we repair it, you destroy it again. It’s quite easy.
What we will do, and I promise you, in three years, we will do the same with the connection between St Petersburg and Kaliningrad in the [Baltic] Sea. Then they need [the Suwalki] connection, not block, and that’s more difficult. Please, you [Russia] block my Suwalki, I block your Finnish Gulf. But I need the time, just give me two years; we already have sea mines.
The Suwalki gap – gate, line, whatever – that is not only our problem. Next year, we will get the capabilities to cause a strategic dilemma for Russia. We may close the Baltic Sea communication line [between Russia’s exclave of Kaliningrad and St Petersburg], and then the Suwalki gap is not a gap, […] but they need it even more [themselves]. Läs artikel