[…] The addition of Finland and Sweden serves to extend the power distribution of NATO’s northern flank. Although Finland and Sweden are wealthy countries with small-scale militaries, their military equipment cannot to be underestimated. The two countries are characterized by strong defense industrial capability. To be specific, Finland, as an integral part of the military-industrial complex composed of the US and over 10 other countries, has the ability to build an even stronger air defense pattern in Europe together with its NATO Allies. Sweden’s Gripen fighter series has performed well, and Sweden has professional experience in the Arctic and submarine fields, and can also help expand the strength of other US-led multilateral alliances.

Not only can the two countries bring modern, highly specialized military forces into NATO, but they can also achieve a win-win situation with the US. On the one hand, the US nuclear umbrella is highly attractive to the two countries. Even if the two countries get into a conflict with Russia, there is no need to worry about the threat of Russian nuclear weapons. At the same time, the frequent commitment to European security as made by the US has also made the two countries feel quite assured. On the other hand, while committed to providing security for Europe, the US also takes the principle of collective defense as its concept to stabilize Europe with the European security strategic partners, and ensure the US worry-free in entering other parts of the world.

As of now, the Finnish and Swedish troops have regularly participated in NATO exercises, featuring high interoperability to jointly deal with Russia. And also the US is free to deal with opponents even tougher. The accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO may indeed allow the US to be free to deal with other opponents; however, it is still a big question as to whether Europe can gain stability and whether Finland and Sweden can benefit from the move. Läs artikel

[…] Biden took to the pages of The Washington Post to justify the trip in advance and outline what he sees as his administration’s wins in the Middle East, which he called ”more stable and secure than the one [his] administration inherited 18 months ago.” One of his successes, Biden wrote, has been keeping American soldiers out of conflicts: ”Next week, I will be the first president to visit the Middle East since 9/11 without U.S. troops engaged in a combat mission there,” he said. ”It’s my aim to keep it that way.”

That’s true on some level. Biden announced the full withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan last April, stuck to his August 31 deadline, and ended America’s longest war. It was an overdue move and one that undoubtedly helped spare U.S. soldiers from bloody conflict down the line.

But the Middle East is far larger than just Afghanistan, and so is America’s involvement in the region. In truth, U.S. troops are engaged in all sorts of activities there—not all of them peaceful.

Biden himself sent a letter to Congress last month to keep lawmakers ”informed about deployments of United States Armed Forces equipped for combat.” He outlined a bevy of activities involving American soldiers across the Middle East (many of which sound a lot like U.S. troops engaged in combat missions). ”No United States Armed Forces are in Afghanistan,” Biden noted, but they are ”working by, with, and through local partners to conduct operations against ISIS forces in Iraq and Syria and against al-Qa’ida in Syria.” Some American soldiers remain ”in strategically significant locations in Syria to conduct operations” against terrorist threats there.

American military personnel are also ”deployed to Yemen to conduct operations against al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula and ISIS.” Approximately 2,733 U.S. forces are present in Saudi Arabia, where they ”protect United States forces and interests in the region against hostile action by Iran and Iran-backed groups” and ”provide air and missile defense capabilities” to the kingdom. Nearly 3,000 American military personnel are in Jordan under the guise of helping to fight ISIS, and some are in Turkey doing the same. Läs artikel

EU har ikke længere råd til, at medlemslande kan beholde vetoretten over for udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik, Det duer ikke, hvis Europa skal bevare en ledende rolle i den globale politik.

Det mener Tysklands forbundskansler, Olaf Scholz.

Krigen i Ukraine har gjort spørgsmålet mere magtpåliggende, skriver han i en kommentar i avisen Frankfurter Allgemeine. Han siger, at det må være slut med, at enkelte stater ”egoistisk blokerer” for fælleseuropæiske beslutninger. En fælles politik skal gælde lige fra migrationspolitik til udviklingen af et fælles europæisk forsvar. For EU skal være en geopolitisk aktør på verdensscenen. Läs artikel

The secretary general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Jens Stoltenberg, recently announced the US-led military bloc’s goal of expanding its so-called ‘Response Force’ from its current strength of 40,000 to a force of more than 300,000 troops. “We will enhance our battlegroups in the eastern part of the Alliance up to brigade-levels,” Stoltenberg declared. “We will transform the NATO Response Force and increase the number of our high readiness forces to well over 300,000.”

The announcement, made at the end of NATO’s annual summit, held in Madrid, Spain, apparently took several defense officials from the NATO membership by surprise, with one such official calling Stoltenberg’s figures “number magic.” Stoltenberg appeared to be working from a concept that had been developed within NATO headquarters based upon assumptions made by his staffers, as opposed to anything resembling coordinated policy among the defense organizations of the 30 nations that make up the bloc. […]

The bloc is but a shadow of its former self, a pathetic collection of under-funded military organizations more suited for the parade ground than the battlefield. No military organization more represents this colossal collapse in credibility and capability than the British Army.[…]

Take, for example, the offer of written security assurances to Sweden and Finland made by British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. These pledges were designed to bolster the resolve of the two Nordic nations as they considered their applications to join NATO.

But there was no substance to the British offer, if for no other reason than the British had nothing in the way of viable military capability to offer either the Swedes or the Finns. Even as Johnson proffered the proverbial hand of assistance to his newfound Nordic allies, the UK Ministry of Defense was wrestling with planned force reductions that would see the British Army cut from its current “established strength” of 82,000 to 72,500 by 2025 (the actual strength of the British Army is around 76,500, reflecting ongoing difficulties in recruitment and retention.)

Even these numbers are misleading – the British Army is only capable of generating one fully combat-ready maneuver brigade (3,500 to 4,000 men with all the necessary equipment and support). Given the reality that the UK is already on the hook for a reinforced battalion-sized “battlegroup” that is to be deployed to Estonia as part of NATO’s so-called enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) posture (joining three other similarly-sized “battlegroups” fielded by the US in Poland, Germany in Lithuania, and Canada in Latvia), it is questionable whether the British could even accomplish this limited task.  Läs artikel

he Biden administration has painted a world of allies united against Russia. But the numbers show a more complex picture.

Though Western Europe and NATO have found revived purpose in mobilizing against Russia’s war, many countries in the Global South — in Africa, Asia, and Latin America — have not taken as strong of a side.

In the first United Nations General Assembly vote in early March, 141 countries affirmed that Russia should “immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw,” and in another resolution, 140 countries voted for humanitarian protections of Ukrainians.

But when the General Assembly voted in early April to expel Russia from the Human Rights Council, the majority was smaller. Ninety-three countries voted in favor, but 58 abstained and 24 voted against. The abstentions included Egypt, Ghana, India, and Indonesia, which were leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement — countries that created their own transnational grouping rather than back the US or Soviet Union during the Cold War. Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, and South Africa also abstained. China voted against.

The US and NATO have led unprecedented sanctions against Russia. But almost no countries in the Global South have signed onto them. Läs artikel

At the Group of 20 meetings in Bali last Friday, Retno Marsudi, the host nation’s foreign minister, urged the world’s leading economic powers to work towards ending the war in Ukraine, noting that “the ripple effects are being felt globally on food, on energy and physical space.”

“It is our responsibility to end the war sooner rather than later and settle our differences at the negotiating table, not at the battlefield,” she said.

But stark divisions between factions led by the United States and Europe on one side, and Russia and to some extent China on the other, meant that the proceedings concluded with no consensus on the matter. The G20 foreign ministers took no group photo as is customary and they issued no joint communique. Instead, the AP pointed out, “acrimony appeared pervasive, especially between Russia and Western participants.” Läs artikel

Turkiet har övergått från att vara en parlamentarisk republik till en exekutiv presidentrepublik. Regelbundna allmänna val hålls. Respekten för de mänskliga rättigheterna, demokrati och rättsstatens
principer urholkas fortlöpande. Situationen präglas av det tvååriga undantagstillstånd som infördes efter kuppförsöket 2016 och påföljande nlagändringar, vilka har försvagat viktiga demokratiska kontrollmekanismer och stärkt presidentämbetet ytterligare. Inte minst rättsväsendets oberoende och rättssäkerheten har undergrävts.
Europadomstolens domar verkställs inte konsekvent. Korruption fortsätter att vara ett utbrett problem.
Lagar mot terrorism och brott mot staten, liksom anklagelser om förtal av presidenten, används för att tysta oliktänkande och regimkritiker. Detta gäller även oppositionspolitiker, särskilt från det prokurdiska Folkets demokratiska parti (HDP). Läs rapporten

[…] I Försvarsbeslut 2020 står det klart att Försvarsmakten bör införskaffa vapensystem med förmåga att på långa avstånd med precision verka mot mål på marken (Regeringen 2021:20/31). Vilka specifika vapensystem som är tänkta att utgöra Försvarsmaktens framtida förmåga till långräckviddig bekämpning framgår dock inte av aktuellt försvarsbeslut. Vilka alternativ som finns är mer eller mindre begränsat till spekulationer, varför denna artikel inte avser att fördjupa sig ytterligare i just den diskussionen. Det som dock står klart är att Saab i mars 2017 mottog en order från FMV att förse Marinen och Flygvapnet med nästa generation av Robotsystem 15 (RBS 15). […]

Men om syftet med införandet av dessa vapensystem är att kunna precisionsbekämpa markmål upp till 30 mil bort, så uppstår också osökt frågan: vad utgör prioriterade mål och i vilken kontext? Kryssningsrobotar innebär för Sveriges del inte bara att ett nytt vapensystem tillförs; här uppstår även nya operativa och strategiska handlingsalternativ, nämligen möjligheten att angripa motståndaren på dennes egna territorium. Avståndet från Gotlands södra udde till Kaliningrad är drygt 250 km, alltså väl inom porté för den kommande versionen av RBS 15. Efter det att krigstillstånd förklarats finns, rent juridiskt, inga hinder för att genomföra insatser mot motståndarens eget territorium. Denna fråga genererar också en följdfråga; om Olle skall motas i grind, och motståndaren skall angripas på sin egen mark, vilket handlingsutrymme och vilka styrningar återfinns i våra styrande reglementen och doktriner beträffande denna typ av vapeninsats? Läs artikel

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