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[…] Hva ville skjedd hvis en regjering la frem en langsiktig helse- eller veiplan med en lett gjennomskuelig feilmargin på mer enn 120 milliarder? Det ville kanskje blitt litt bråk i mediene og på Stortinget? Men ikke da NATOs nåværende generalsekretær, som statsminister for 11 år siden, la frem en slik plan. Det til tross for at det alt da var klart at 50 F-35 supermaktskampfly ville påtvinge oss nevnte budsjettstruktur, NATOs skjeveste. […]

Igjen: Hva er grunnen? Sverige har småstatsforsvarsjageren Gripen, med driftskostnader på ca. 15 prosent av F-35. De får råd til dobbelt så mange fly som oss og samtidig penger til andre tiltak vi ikke makter.

Vi samarbeider med Nederland, Belgia og Danmark om kampfly av typen F-16. Alle anskaffer F-35. Men legger vi NATOs toprosentsmål til grunn, satser Norge dobbelt så mye på flyet som gjennomsnittet for de andre. De går heller ikke for supermaktsovervåkningsflyet Poseidon. Läs artikel

Regeringen vill ha drygt 1 000 färre heltidsanställda soldater än Försvarsmakten, skriver Svenska Dagbladet.

I regleringsbrevet för 2020 är gränsen för antalet heltidsanställda soldater 5 700 – att jämföra med Försvarsmaktens egen rekommenderade nivå på 6 750.

”I avvaktan på ny försvarspolitisk proposition 2021–25 får antalet anställda GSS/K (kontinuerligt anställda gruppbefäl, soldater och sjömän) inte nämnvärt överstiga 5 700”, står det i regleringsbrevet från regeringssammanträdet före julhelgen. Läs artikel

China, Iran and Russia will hold joint naval drills starting on Friday in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Oman, China’s defense ministry said on Thursday, amid heightened tension in the region between Iran and the United States. […]

The Gulf of Oman is a particularly sensitive waterway as it connects to the Strait of Hormuz – through which about a fifth of the world’s oil passes – which in turn connects to the Gulf.

The drills are also coming at a time of fraught tensions between the United States and Iran. Läs artikel

Andrei Martyanov’s latest book provides unceasing evidence about the kind of lethality waiting for U.S. forces in a possible, future war against real armies (not the Taliban or Saddam Hussein’s).

Once in a blue moon an indispensable book comes out making a clear case for sanity in what is now a post-MAD world. That’s the responsibility carried by “The (Real) Revolution in Military Affairs,” by Andrei Martyanov (Clarity Press), arguably the most important book of 2019.

Martyanov is the total package — and he comes with extra special attributes as a top-flight Russian military analyst, born in Baku in those Back in the U.S.S.R. days, living and working in the U.S., and writing and blogging in English.

Right from the start, Martyanov wastes no time destroying not only Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s ravings but especially Graham Allison’s childish and meaningless Thucydides Trap argument — as if the power equation between the U.S. and China in the 21^stcentury could be easily interpreted in parallel to Athens and Sparta slouching towards the Peloponnesian War over 2,400 years ago. What next? Xi Jinping as the new Genghis Khan? Läs artikel

In this autobiographical essay, I narrate my experience of being positioned in public as naive in my profession and a traitor to my country after publishing an op-ed in Sweden’s largest daily newspaper, in which I argued that Sweden should not join NATO — the transatlantic military alliance. Some of the negative reactions came from within my own workplace.

I had just been promoted to Professor at the Swedish Defence University and colleagues thought I had also betrayed them and the university by publishing the piece. In this essay, I disclose some of the reactions I encountered but, more importantly, I try to understand the effect they had on me, recounting my own inner dialogue of shame and resistance. At times I worried that I lacked expertise or even secretly harboured an affinity with the country that is now seen to motivate a Swedish NATO membership — i.e. Russia. At other times, I tried to turn the tables on the stigmatisers, claiming that it was they who had to change. While I work in a highly militarised environment, I think the fear of social death and professional shame I explore in this essay has broader resonance. Läs artikel

As our debacles in Vietnam and Iraq demonstrate, expert consensus is not always a recipe for success. Perhaps it should come as no surprise that American policy toward Ukraine has also been steeped in illusions.

The war between Ukraine, Russia and Russian-backed separatists in Ukraine’s Donbass region has reached its sixth year. So far, it has claimed some thirteen thousand lives and displaced millions of people. It threatens to create an unstable line of long-term confrontation between Russia and the West dividing the heart of central Europe, or even spiral into a broader conflict. With so much at stake, are American government experts on Ukraine vigorously debating how to handle this daunting challenge more effectively? Not a chance. Läs artikel

Som första svenska statsminister är Stefan Löfven inbjuden att tala inför Sydkoreas nationalförsamling. Något bara fem utländska ledare tidigare har gjort.

Inför nationalförsamlingen säger Stefan Löfven att det är en prioritet att fortsätta arbeta för kärnvapennedrustning.

– Vi kommer att fortsätta att erbjuda vårt diplomatiska stöd, säger Stefan Löfven.

– Vi är övertygade om att kärnvapennedrustningen är en förutsättning för fred på den koreanska halvön.

Statsministern har inför talet haft ett möte med Sydkoreas talman Moon Hee-Sang. Stefan Löfven uttrycker i talet beundran över att Sydkorea har utvecklats från ett land sargat av krig och i stor fattigdom till en demokrati och en av världens största ekonomier. Läs artikel

On 2 March 2019, Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, gave a speech where he launched what he called a “strategy of active
defence”. It summarises Russian security thinking and the
modernization of the Russian Armed Forces – and indicates the flavour of the next Russian doctrine, expected in 2020. In this brief we will interpret this speech in view of the evolution of Russian military capabilities over the last decade, with emphasis on the role of precision-guided missiles and the role of the Russian Navy. We will argue that Russia is still likely – if not even more likely – to continue to use military force as a foreign- and security policy tool. […]

In his speech, Gerasimov displayed a particular appreciation for precision-strike capabilities, which proliferation in Russia is profoundly changing its ability to deter, threaten or destroy an adversary. The most accessible examples to mention would be the Kalibr cruise missiles, which can mounted on both submarines and other vessels, and the ground launched Iskander. The 9M729 Novator cruise missile, which triggered the break-up of the INF Treaty due to its long range, is another.
The evolution of thought surrounding the use and strategic effect of precision strike is reportedly subject to experimentation in Russian doctrinal thinking and seems to be characterised by an innate tension between the defensive and offensive. […]

Russia’s limited resources has forced it to think outside the box – both in means and ways. What could be uncomfortable about this situation is that, from a tactical military point of view, it promulgates a first-strike approach from the Russian side. In case of an escalating political conflict, the calculus may be that it will achieve more by striking early than by waiting for a broader Western mobilization. If, in a future Russian constellation of power, the military leaders are hawkish and the political leaders weak, this would be a concerning scenario. Läs artikel

Den norskbaserade siten The Barents Observer rapporterar att Ryssland nu har baserat sin nya flygplansburna missil Kinzhal på Kolahalvön, Franz Josefs land och Novaja Zemlja. Missilen bärs av stridsflygplan av typen MIG-31K, vilket gör att den utgör ett möjligt hot mot europeiska Arktis, norra Skandinavien och Nordatlanten. […]

Ryssland oroar sig för framtiden bland annat rörande New START-avtalet om strategiska kärnvapen, som löper ut 2021, vilket har lett till deras förnyade satsning på sådana vapensystem. Generalen sade att den hypersoniska missilen Kinzhal nu är försöksstationerad på ryska baser i skilda klimatzoner, inklusive Arktis. Läs artikel

[…]  The Hungarian Air Force decided to acquire Gripens in 2003, with Czechia following in 2005. Slovakia is finally replacing their MiGs in 2018, with the decision down to the Gripen or the F-16. The F-16 is said to be more expensive. Bulgaria is in a similar situation, with the Eurofighter and F/A-18 also in consideration. Poland decided to acquire F-16s instead, probably due to their close relations with the United States. For small European countries on a budget, the Gripen makes a lot of sense. Due to the smaller area of patrol, a dual-engine design is not as necessary as it is in Finland or Canada (both of which operate F/A-18s, a dual-engine design). The lower combat range and external stores are less of an issue, as aircraft can be expected to rapidly return to their home bases to rearm.

The Gripen has relatively modern radars and navigation systems compared to the MiG and has integration with export-cleared American missiles (in the C and D “export-ready” variants) one of the largest factors for Gripen adoption is the very low flight hour cost. Gripens were rated by Jane’s to have a cost of around $4700 per flight hour. Next cheapest was the F-16 at $7000 per flight hour. Other European designs and the F/A-18 go over $10,000 per flight hour. Given that the MiG-29 has flight hour cost of around $4500 per flight hour, the Gripen is a logical choice to keep sustainment budgets from growing too much relative to past jets. Läs artikel

[…] Grunnlovenvar likevel dokumentert da prinsippet om allmenn verneplikt første gang ble fastsatt, og tjenesten for landet for alvor begynte å vinne oppslutning.

– Fra gammelt av var det tvang og til en viss grad pisk og gulrot. Det var med den moderne stat og folkesuverenitetsprinsippet (makt av folket, journ. anm.) at verne- plikten utviklet seg, sier Karsten Friis. […]

Karsten Friis ved NUPI forteller at verneplikten har en flere hundre år lang tradisjon i Norge, men det var først ved slutten av 1700- tallet det virkelig begynte å ta form.

– Ideen om Norge som nasjon var tidligere ikke særlig framtredende. Men etter hvert som folket følte en tilhørighet til landet, var det ikke lenger nødvendig med stor grad av tvang. I takt med at det å tjenestegjøre for staten virket mer meningsfullt, ble voldsmakten mindre vilkårlig, sier Friis.

Da de 112 representantene fra landet rundt (unntatt Nord-Norge), reiste til Eidsvoll for å utarbeide Grunnloven var paragrafen om verneplikt noe av det som ble diskutert, forteller Friis.

– Det var brytninger mellom Eidsvollsmennene i 1814, de som ønsket å innlemme en paragraf om verneplikt og de som motsatte seg det. Argumentet var at verneplikt krenket menneskets «naturlige frihet», men de som holdt fram dette tilhørte mindretallet, sier Friis.

Lars Thorbjørn Larsen kledd opp i en 1814 uniform i forbindelse med 200 års grunnlovsjubileum.

Selv om forkjemperne for verneplikt vant fram, innebar imidlertid ikke det at alle måtte tjenestegjøre.

– Man kunne fortsatt kjøpe seg fri gjennom en stedfortreder, det vil si at en annen gjennomførte tjenesten. I tillegg var byfolk og akademikere unntatt verneplikten, det samme var nordlendinger – til et godt stykke ut på 1800-tallet, sier Friis. Läs artikel

2020 års försvarsbeslut kommer att fattas mot bakgrund av den snabbaste och mest djupgående försämring av omvärldsläget som vi upplevt sedan det sena 1930-talet. Extra allvarligt blir det därför att hela det internationella säkerhetssystemet är i gungning, samtidigt som Sverige fortfarande har en försvarsmakt utformad för enstaka internationella fredsinsatser.

Sverige var långtifrån ensamt om att köpa det förföriska budskapet om att Den Eviga Freden hade brutit ut efter sovjetkommunismens sammanbrott. Nästan alla Europas länder gjorde likadant och rustade ner drastiskt. Ryssland skulle ju bli ett demokratiskt västland, trodde man, och Kina skulle tvingas till demokratisering av en växande medelklass.  […]

Sverige har länge haft ett avskräckningsunderskott gentemot Sovjet/Ryssland och löst detta genom att åka snålskjuts på den transatlantiska länken, först genom Erlanders och Palmes hemliga västsamarbete, sedan genom Hultqvistdoktrinen. Men  om USA vänder Europa ryggen finns knappast längre denna möjlighet. Vilka handlingsalternativ har då Sverige? Finns det – eller skulle det kunna finnas – en svensk Plan B? Jag kan i alla fall inte se någon uppenbar och användbar reservoption för oss. Läs artikel