Dr Ian Davis som har grundat sajten NATO Watch och är dess ”director” har författat en synnerligen intressant, gedigen och oroväckande rapport om de nordiska staternas försvarssamarbetsavtal med USA. Davis är ”Executive Editor” av SIPRI:s Yearbook och “Associate Senior Fellow” i SIPRI:s “Conflict and Peace” program. Rapporten kommer lägligt inte minst med tanke på att USA:s tunga B-52 bombplan, som kan förses med kärnvapen, i veckan som gick flög in över Sverige och fortsatte till Finland där man simulerade fällningar av bomber på ett skjutfält beläget nära den ryska gränsen.
I rapporten gör han en grundlig genomgång av de nordiska staternas DCA-avtal och övriga försvarssamarbeten med det stora landet i väst. Rapporten är högst aktuell och tar upp även det implementeringsavtal som Sverige nyligen träffat med USA. De restriktioner som gällt beträffande ”baspolitik”, kärnvapen, lagring av militär utrustning och överflygningar granskas.
De 48 nordiska baser som omfattas av samarbetet med USA behandlas utförligt, liksom för övrigt de ryska och amerikanska baserna i norr. Arktis som brännpunkt för stormaktsrivaliteten ges en skrämmande och övertygande analys. När det gäller militariseringen av Arktis och farorna som hotar lyfter Davis sammanfattningsvis fram särskilt följande punkter:
”• DCAs enable permanent US military presence and infrastructure development north of the Arctic Circle, turning the region into a forward operating zone.
• Facilities in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Greenland and Denmark give NATO and US forces proximity to Russia’s Northern Fleet and nuclear bases.
• Increased military exercises, enhanced surveillance, dual-use infrastructure and rapid-response capabilities have intensified strategic competition and risks of escalation.”
Davis understryker särskilt den nordliga inriktningen på baserna:
Finland
“The 15 facilities and areas include four airbases, a military port and railway access to northern Finland, where the US military will have a storage area alongside a railway that leads up to the Russian border. Finland has also been improving its railway infrastructure on its Swedish border, to make it easier for allies to send reinforcements and equipment from across the Atlantic to Kemijarvi, an hour’s drive from the Russian border and seven hours from Russia’s military bases near Murmansk in the Kola Peninsula.”
Sverige
”As in the US-Finland DCA, far northern bases are given a high level of priority, with four included in the Swedish DCA: the air bases of Luleå (home to the Norrbotten Wing, one of three wings in Sweden) and Vidsel (an aerospace test and evaluation asset), as well as the regimental area and military camp of Boden (home to the Boden Artillery Regiment) and Kiruna (home to parts of the Lapland Jaeger Brigade).”
Norge
“These 12 “agreed areas” (five of which are in the Arctic) are basically limited places to be used jointly by the United States, Norway, and other allies to conduct military training and exercise, deploy forces and store military equipment and supplies.”
Beträffande styrkeläget ger Davis följande övergripande bild:
”Although Russia’s bases inside the Arctic Circle outnumber NATO’s the actual operational picture is relatively balanced, especially given that Russia’s northern border makes up 53 percent of the Arctic coastline. Russia has rebuilt the Northern Fleet (based in Murmansk) into its most powerful joint command, with new submarines (e.g.,Yasen-class nuclear-powered general-purpose attack submarines and Borei-class ballistic missile submarines, SSBNs), surface vessels, and coastal defence systems.
Over 70% of Russia’s strategic nuclear submarines are based in the Arctic. Moscow has also added new Arctic brigades, reopened many Soviet-era bases and deployed S-400, Bastion antiship missile and Kinzhal ballistic airland missile systems along the Northern Sea Route. Among the new bases and infrastructure are Tiksi (East Siberian Sea), which was reebuilt as a military-civilian hub, and Rogava (Franz Josef Land), a new airbase with MiG-31K fighters (carrying Kinzhal hypersonic missiles).
NATO in turn has re-activated the Atlantic Command (Norfolk) and established a Joint Force Command Norfolk in July 2019, while US, UK and French carrier groups now routinely deploy above the Arctic Circle. New or upgraded airfields and ports— Evenes (Norway), Keflavík (Iceland), Pituffik (Greenland), Rovaniemi (Finland), Luleå (Sweden) and Kallax (Sweden)—now support fifth-generation fighters, P-8 patrol aircraft (which has significant ASW capability) and B-1/B-52 bombers. Airspace violations or challenges, mainly involving Russia, are now increasingly common, although comprehensive Arctic-specific data is limited.”
Davis redovisar övervaknings- och övningsverksamheten i området och de militära styrkorna som finns där, liksom närvaron av marina stridskrafter och flygvapen. Även de arktiska strategidokumenten granskas. Han tecknar en oroväckande bild:
“First, the DCAs allow a permanent, not just rotational, US footprint. The agreements legalise year-round presence of US forces, pre-positioned equipment, simplified entry procedures and exclusive access to key regional facilities—turning the Arctic into an integrated NATO theatre. Once equipment is pre-positioned, only personnel need to fly in, turning the High North into a forward operating area rather than a training venue. This will inevitably lead to more US combat aircraft and warships operating in the region. The bases at Rovaniemi, Evenes and Luleå, for example, give US/NATO airpower direct reach into the Barents Sea and Kola Peninsula, enabling front-line aircraft to be operated within 200-400 km of the Russian Northern Fleet’s ballistic-missile submarine bases – the crown jewels of Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Prepositioned stockpiles will also enable faster reinforcement, especially if similar caves/warehouses to those operating in Norway’s ‘Marine Corps Pre-positioning Program-Norway’ are developed in northern Finland and Sweden.”
Detta är en utveckling som Ryssland svarar på enligt Davis:
“The US and Nordic states fear Chinese-Russian convergence in the region, but the US/NATO build-up prompts Russia (and to a lesser extent China) to respond in kind, fuelling an action-reaction cycle. Increased military activity also heightens the risk of miscalculations and intercepts (e.g., near Russian airspace or at sea). Moscow has already announced new Arctic coastal missile regiments, longer bomber patrols over the Barents, and forward staging of MiG-31K (Kinzhal) aircraft.”
Kärnvapenproblematiken avhandlas utförligt i rapporten, liksom DCA-avtalens inverkan på de nordiska staternas suveränitet. Grönlands och Islands roll och ställning diskuteras, och även den historiska bakgrunden tecknas.
Avslutningsvis konstaterar Davis:
“The Nordic DCAs with the United States exacerbate existing militarisation trends in the Arctic, increase the risk that additional nuclear weapons may be deployed to the region (beyond the existing SSBNs), raise difficult sovereignty and constitutional issues and add to the uncertainties over the future governance of Greenland. The DCAs do not automatically station thousands of US troops in the Arctic tomorrow. What they do, however, is create the legal, logistical and physical architecture that turns the High North into a ready-made forward operating zone for US and wider NATO forces. That architecture—new runways, fuel lines, caves full of munitions, hardened command-andcontrol nodes—locks in a permanent military dimension that simply did not exist a decade ago.”
Vad bör då göras? Davis tar i en överblick upp följande punkter:
“• Improve Parliamentary oversight: Enhance democratic scrutiny and transparency of DCAs through institutional reforms and coordinated Nordic parliamentary cooperation.
• Halt and reverse Arctic militarisation: Promote diplomatic dialogue with Russia, establish military security mechanisms, respect Indigenous rights and support sustainable development.
• Reduce nuclear risks: Strengthen Nordic unity on nuclear nonproliferation, invest in education and dialogue, support international treaties like the NPT and TPNW and advocate for nuclear risk reduction.
• Protect Greenland: Build legal and diplomatic shields, economic sovereignty and stronger local security capacity to resist great power pressure. Collective Nordic approaches are advised to revoke or renegotiate DCAs if US unpredictability or Greenland concerns intensify”
Denna rapport är ett måste för den som vill förstå hur spänningarna ökar i den Höga Nord och vad som kan göras för att dämpa dem.
Rapporten i dess helhet kan läsas här:
NW_NordicDCAs_v4_BLCG_AR2017_v1b.qxd (natowatch.org)