[…] In this environment, the United States is prioritizing the most consequential threats to Americans’ interests, especially the defense of the U.S. homeland and interests in the Western Hemisphere, as well as reinforcing deterrence by denial in the Western Pacific. At the same time – and critically – the United States and its allies must be prepared for the possibility that potential opponents will act simultaneously across multiple theaters, whether in a coordinated fashion or opportunistically. […]
The core strategic reality laid out by the NSS and NDS is this: Europe must assume primary responsibility for its own conventional defense.
This is not a matter of ideology or rhetorical flourish. It is a conclusion grounded in a clear-eyed and rigorous assessment of the strategic environment we face as well as a pragmatic evaluation of the capabilities at our disposal.
Europe has immense strengths: it is wealthy, populous, and has formidable industrial and technological capabilities. And Europe faces, on its own continent, a real and persistent military challenge.
At the same time, the United States must – and will – prioritize those theaters and challenges where only American power can play a decisive role, as the National Defense Strategy lays out. That is not a retreat from Europe. It is, rather, an affirmation of strategic pragmatism and a recognition of our allies’ undeniable ability to step up and lead on Europe’s defense in a way that leaves all of us stronger and safer. By leveraging our respective strengths and specializing in areas where we are best positioned to act, we can build a more balanced, effective, and resilient Alliance.
Under President Trump’s leadership, we are reprioritizing the defense of our homeland and the protection of our interests in our Hemisphere. We are grappling forthrightly with the fact that the Indo-Pacific is now a central arena of geopolitics, one with fundamental implications for American security, economic vitality, and technological leadership.
It follows that Europe should field the preponderance of the forces required to deter and, if necessary, defeat conventional aggression in Europe. […]
For Europe, it means moving beyond inputs and intentions toward outputs and capabilities. Defense spending levels matter, and there is no substitute for it. But what matters at the end of the day is what those resources produce: ready forces, usable munitions, resilient logistics, and integrated command structures that work at scale under stress.
Thus, for the United States, our responsibility is to be clear, candid, and consistent. We will continue to provide the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. And we will also continue, in a more limited and focused fashion, to provide conventional capabilities that contribute to NATO’s defense. Our commitment is to be candid with you, both in regard to the timeline and scale of change, and about the challenges and tradeoffs we face. We will continue to train, exercise, and plan alongside our allies. And we in the Department of War will continue to ready our forces to do our part under Article V with Europe taking the lead for its conventional defense. Läs talet