The impact of (the absence of) recognition on the use of force

[…] In view of the above, if China does decide to resort to force against Taiwan, it is certain that it will not consider its operations as regulated by jus contra bellum. Whether the US will indeed assist Taiwan militarily on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter remains to be seen. It has been suggested that in case China attacks Taiwan, the US could proceed to formal recognition of Taiwan as a State and then resort to military action that would be lawful under the collective exercise of Taiwan’s right to self-defence (Fisher, 2020: 145). As the previous analysis and the reactions to Russia’s recognition of Donetsk and Lugansk show, it is highly doubtful that recognition will be the decisive argument in making such a resort to force lawful under jus contra bellum. The legality of the resort to force on either side will revolve around the question of whether Taiwan is a State not on whether the States involved in the conflict have recognized Taiwan as a State.