[…] The real difference between the Cold War and the present situation in the Baltic Sea is that NATO needs to preserve resupply to the isolated Baltic states and Finland. These states possess limited naval forces, leaving Germany, Sweden, Norway, and Poland to substantially shoulder the burden of sea control across the region.
NATO Task Force Baltic, established in the German port of Rostock in late 2024, can serve as the umbrella headquarters for this effort, but it will take significant ship contributions to attain and maintain sea control. Germany has multiple air defense frigates, as do Norway and Denmark, but these might also be committed to other NATO missions outside the Baltic.
Sweden is growing its fleet, with four new air defense frigates and three A-26 submarines, to help satisfy the sea control mission. Denmark’s navy is also expanding, as is Poland’s.
Baltic nations have long confronted Soviet and now Russian threats, but the shift to a sea control objective is revolutionary for new NATO members such as Sweden, which has historically pursued a sea denial mission in the Baltic region.
The seismic nature of the change is underscored by the fact that Sweden is now operating combat units in Europe outside its national borders for the first time since the Napoleonic wars (other than UN peacekeeping force contributions.) And protection of sea, rail, and road routes from Gothenburg to the east will be essential for the maintenance of NATO’s Nordic flank against potential Russian aggression.
The level of commitment of both Sweden and Finland, as well as that of the Baltic states to their self-defense, highlights a common fear among many Europeans that Russia’s next target, once its war on Ukraine has ended, could be the Baltic region.
Russian naval, air, and missile power, in both the Kaliningrad oblast and closer to St Petersburg, could massively disrupt NATO efforts to resupply its front lines in the Baltic states and Finland. Läs artikel